SPIFFE workload identity visualization

SPIFFE and SPIRE: Zero Trust Service Identity

How does Service A know that Service B is actually Service B? I keep coming back to that question because the usual answer is uncomfortable. For years we trusted network location. Traffic from the right IP was legitimate, end of story. Zero trust took that assumption out back and shot it. Now every service has to prove who it is, every single request, no matter where it sits on the network. ...

July 26, 2025 · 11 min read · Tom Meurs
Kyverno policy governance visualization

Kyverno Policies: Governance as Code for Kubernetes

I used to keep a wiki page titled “Cluster conventions”. Resource limits on everything. No :latest tags. No deploys in the default namespace. It was a good page. Nobody read it. Six months in, half the cluster broke those rules and I only found out when something fell over. A rule that lives in a doc is a suggestion. A rule the API server refuses to accept is governance. That gap is the whole reason this post exists. ...

July 14, 2025 · 12 min read · Tom Meurs
Vault secrets management visualization

Vault for Beginners: Secrets Management in Kubernetes

The first time I ran kubectl get secret myapp -o yaml and base64-decoded the value, I felt my stomach drop. There was my database password, sitting in etcd, readable by anyone who could reach the API with the right RBAC. Kubernetes Secrets are not secrets. They’re base64-encoded plain text with a fancy name. That’s the default, and it’s the thing nobody warns you about on day one. Every cloud provider has a fix for sale. AWS has Secrets Manager, Google has Secret Manager, Azure has Key Vault. They work. The catch shows up later: the day you need to migrate, the day you want to know exactly what happens to a secret after you write it, the day you realise your most sensitive data lives in a system you can’t inspect. ...

July 2, 2025 · 13 min read · Tom Meurs
Kubernetes Network Policies visual guide

Kubernetes Network Policies: A Visual Guide to Pod Security

Picture this: an attacker pops a single pod in your cluster, maybe through a vulnerable image or a leaked token. From that one foothold, they can reach every database, every internal API, every secret-fetching sidecar you run. Nothing stops them, because by default nothing tries to. Network Policies are the thing that stops them. They turn “one compromised pod” into “one compromised pod, and that’s it.” Everyone knows they should use them. Almost nobody actually does, because the YAML looks scary and the behaviour is weird until the mental model clicks. ...

February 8, 2025 · 8 min read · Tom Meurs