Security

The whole pitch of GitOps is that Git is the source of truth. That promise holds right up until someone runs kubectl edit on a deployment at 2am to stop an incident, a mutating webhook quietly rewrites a resource, or a half-finished sync leaves your cluster somewhere between what Git wanted and what it got. Now Git says one thing and the cluster does another, and nobody told you. That gap is configuration drift, and it is the part of GitOps people forget to defend. The good news: ArgoCD already watches for it. The catch is that the defaults don’t do what you probably assume, and a few of them will bite you. This post walks from the simplest possible drift check up to the setup I actually run, one layer at a time. Stop wherever you have enough. ...

Picture this: an attacker pops a single pod in your cluster, maybe through a vulnerable image or a leaked token. From that one foothold, they can reach every database, every internal API, every secret-fetching sidecar you run. Nothing stops them, because by default nothing tries to. Network Policies are the thing that stops them. They turn “one compromised pod” into “one compromised pod, and that’s it.” Everyone knows they should use them. Almost nobody actually does, because the YAML looks scary and the behaviour is weird until the mental model clicks. ...